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Timothy C. Winegard. The First World Oil War. Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2016. Pp. 416.
Timothy Winegard seeks to highlight the role of oil in shaping the 
First World War and the resulting peace arrangements by examining 
a little-known British military force sent to Baku, the capital of 
modern-day Azerbaijan, in 1918.1 Drawing upon Australian, 
Canadian, and British sources, The First World Oil War argues 
that the war and its immediate aftermath created Anglo-American 
hegemony over world oil supplies.
The centenary of the First World War brought forward a number 
of works on the war, with a particular focus on the conflict’s origins. 
Christopher Clark’s Sleepwalkers (2013) and Thomas Otte’s July 
Crisis (2014) are two of the more prominent works.2 Those authors 
who have dealt with the war’s legacies have focused on topics such as 
veterans and commemoration.3 In contrast, Winegard highlights the 
war’s long-term geopolitical consequences by examining the struggle 
for oil supplies, which set in motion a number of contemporary 
challenges such as the heterogeneous origins of Iraq.
While oil did not cause the First World War, the author shows 
how oil already played an important role in advanced economies 
by 1914 and shaped wartime strategy and operations. The Royal 
Navy’s conversion from coal to oil for propulsion led Whitehall to 
acquire a controlling interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. 
Unlike coal, Britain had few native oil supplies and had to find 
reserves elsewhere. The First World War witnessed the first instance 
of military operations focused on seizing territory for the oil beneath 
it. The British incursion into Mesopotamia in 1914, for example, 
sought to secure Ottoman oil supplies in modern-day Iraq. Winegard 
notes that this pattern has continued to shape military plans such as 
Operation Blue, the German assault into the Caucasus in 1942.
1  The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and 
do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government, the Department 
of Defense, or Air University.
2  Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (New 
York: Harper, 2013); and Thomas Otte, July Crisis: The World’s Descent into War, 
Summer 1914 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
3  For a useful survey see Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, The Great War in History: 
Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005). 
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The British sought to secure the oil fields of the Caucasus in the 
First World War, though without deploying a large force. Instead, 
Major General Lionel Dunsterville and 450 elite soldiers were sent 
to secure Baku’s oil fields on the western edge of the Caspian Sea. 
Baku accounted for roughly half of worldwide oil production at the 
turn of the century and in 1918 continued to produce oil on a large 
scale. Russia’s withdrawal from the war after the Bolsheviks began 
to seize power worried British leaders. Prior to their withdrawal, 
Russian forces in the Caucasus were linked with British forces in 
Mesopotamia and the Russian departure created a strategic vacuum 
into which the Germans or Ottomans might move. If Germany or 
the Ottoman Empire acquired the Caucasus’ resources, the crushing 
effects of the ongoing Allied economic blockade would be undermined. 
The Young Turks hoped that oil could resurrect the Ottoman Empire 
by uniting Turkic peoples throughout the Middle East. For their 
part, the Soviets wanted to secure the valuable oil reserves. Whoever 
controlled the Caucasus could threaten Persia and the Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company’s holdings. As a result, the Germans, British, Ottomans, 
and Soviets all “set their sights on the Caucasus,” especially the Baku 
oil fields, in 1918 (p. 41).
Winegard also demonstrates the critical role of Indian defence 
in British strategic planning. If German forces reached Persia, they 
would be in a position to assault the gateways to India, the crown 
jewel of the British Empire. While historians often treat the Middle 
East and South Asia as separate regions, Winegard shows that British 
leaders could not afford this luxury. They viewed the Middle East, 
the Suez Canal, and Egypt collectively as part of the western frontier 
that safeguarded India. Any growth in foreign influence in these 
areas weakened India’s security from the British perspective. The 
First World Oil War makes a valuable contribution by highlighting 
the mental map through which British officials viewed the region. 
In response to these potential threats and the growing naval 
demands for oil, the British senior committee charged with oil policy 
determined in 1917 that Britain needed to take control “as much as 
possible” of global oil supplies (p. 101). The increasingly prominent 
place of oil as one of Britain’s strategic interests was captured in a 
key July 1918 paper prepared by the Navy’s oil expert Admiral Sir 
Edmund Slade, which is reproduced in an appendix. British officials 
also sought to arrange postwar British control of Middle Eastern oil 
fields and Prime Minister Lloyd George authorised the occupation 
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of Mosul with the intention of retaining control of the region in any 
peace settlement.
As an initial step to securing the Caucasus, Dunsterville headed 
north from Baghdad in early 1918 with a small advance party. One 
of his missions was to mobilise irregular Armenian groups in the 
Caucasus which were already battling Ottoman forces in response to 
Turkish and Armenian atrocities in eastern Turkey. The wider region 
was home to a variety of ethnic groups, complicated by numerous 
external actors, whose disparate goals Winegard nicely summarises 
in a list (p. 130). 
Dunsterville’s force, commonly referred to as Dunsterforce, relied 
heavily on experienced Canadian, Australian, and South African 
soldiers and initially reported directly to the War Cabinet, not the 
local commanding general. Initially, Dunsterville hoped to reach Baku 
in twelve days; however, internal squabbling and unforeseen setbacks 
meant it took seven months, from January to August 1918, for his 
force to arrive at its destination. During this delay, Ottoman forces 
launched an offensive into the Caucasus, which strained relations 
with their German allies who viewed operations against the British in 
Mesopotamia and Palestine as more important. In response, Germany 
reached a deal with Georgia, now threatened by Turkish forces, which 
gave Germany military access to Georgia. The Germans hoped to 
use Georgia as a springboard for their own offensive towards Baku. 
By July the Turks were within sight of the Baku oil fields, leading 
to a coup against the local Baku Bolshevik government. The coup 
leaders promptly invited Dunsterville into Baku where the Armenian 
population feared a Turkish occupation. The situation was complex: 
“The Germans armed the Georgians, while the Bolsheviks countered 
by arming Muslims in Abkhazia, Chechnya, and Ossetia to invalidate 
German territorial claims. The British equipped the Armenians to 
withstand the Turks, while the Turks funneled weapons only to the 
Muslims of Azerbaijan to eradicate the Armenians” (p. 199).
However, just as Dunsterville reached Baku, he undermined his 
position by slandering his superior in Baghdad and then evacuating 
Baku in the face of a Turkish attack. Winegard relates how the 
Ottomans allowed Azerbaijani troops to enter the city where they 
massacred thousands of the city’s Armenian inhabitants. Dunsterville 
was branded as a failure in the press and sent to India. After so much 
planning, preparation, and scheming, Dunsterforce turned out to be 
rather anticlimactic.
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In the latter half of his book, Winegard surveys the role of oil in 
shaping the Versailles peace accords, specifically the British insistence 
on controlling Mesopotamia. He goes on to show the importance of 
oil in the creation of the state of Iraq during the 1920s. The work 
then highlights similarities between Britain’s interwar Middle East 
policy and current day American policies in the region. Both nations 
struggled to find military solutions to local insurgencies in Iraq while 
at the same time combating violence in Somalia and Syria. He also 
demonstrates how arrangements created between oil companies in the 
1920s and 1930s continue to shape the modern oil market. He traces 
another link between the two periods, arguing that the Taliban’s 
ideological roots “date to the First World War and harken back to oil” 
(p. 267). The conclusion extends this contemporary focus, noting the 
role of oil in recent international events, while an epilogue highlights 
the importance of hydraulic fracturing on oil markets. Winegard 
convincingly demonstrates that the struggle for control of oil in the 
First World War and its immediate aftermath led to tensions and 
unresolved issues that still trouble the Middle East today.
Winegard effectively argues for a prominent role for oil in 
understanding the First World War and the resulting peace 
settlements. His use of the Dunsterforce to draw out these themes 
works on two levels: exploring this little-known piece of First 
World War military history expands our knowledge of the conflict 
and the force’s specific mission directly relates to the larger issues 
the author wishes to raise such as the ongoing competition for 
oil resources and oil as a source of conflict. The writing style is 
engaging and draws upon a number of personal accounts held 
privately to bring the narrative to life. This work is an important 
contribution to First World War history and is recommended for 
interested readers as well as undergraduate and graduate audiences. 
corbin williamson, air war college
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